Introduction {#Sec1}
============

A main benefit for people living in groups, ranging from families to empires, is that collectively, they can achieve more than the sum of individuals can independently, in particular collective goods \[[@CR10]\]. Cases in point are infrastructure, health care, defense and education for a country's population. People first have to agree on the public good and the way to realize it, but even if they arrive at a consensus, the provision of these goods is non-obvious because individuals are tempted to freeride on others' efforts. Cooperation is a dilemma \[[@CR18]\] that usually requires time to solve, during which people develop norms and form a network to transmit information (gossip) about one another, on the basis of which reputations are established that in their turn are used to reward cooperators and punish defectors \[[@CR8], [@CR17]\].

This scenario is well-covered by the literature, but there are important cases where there is no time to develop it. Examples are disasters where victims need urgent help, protests against dictatorial regimes that prevent critics to organize themselves, and unplanned violent confrontations between groups. These cases have high uncertainty in common. People then realize that cooperation might yield a valuable outcome but they can't assess their payoffs, among others because they don't know if they will get hurt. Our questions are how cooperation under uncertainty is self-organized, and how this is influenced by participants' network.

The first question has been addressed by critical mass theory \[[@CR11], [@CR14]\], which does not rely on norms, reputations and selective incentives (i.e. rewards and punishments). It argues that if a critical number of actors starts cooperating, the others are won over to join in, thereby making cooperation self-reinforcing. Individuals are assumed to know at each moment how many cooperators there are in total, and to have fairly accurate expectations of their marginal payoff. On the basis thereof they can rationally decide to contribute to the public good or to freeload. In highly uncertain situations, however, these rationality assumptions are unlikely to hold true. Moreover, the theory does not show the effect of network topology, and does not explain the cooperation of the initiative takers before the critical point is reached. We, in contrast, explicate the effect of topology, explain the initiative takers endogenously, and instead of rationality assume one simple heuristic: under high uncertainty, people become conformists to the majority of their network neighbors \[[@CR20]\]. This may turn out bad for them in a specific situation but may serve them on average over many occasions \[[@CR2]\]. Conformism can be observed as behavioral synchronization \[[@CR15]\]. When people conform to their initially defecting network neighbors, they might eventually cooperate when many others do, but who would start?

Pending (or starting) violence and disaster are characterized by increasing turmoil, for example in terms of opponents' threats, insults and violence. Turmoil can be measured by participant's heart rates that indicate their arousal \[[@CR13]\] or, in an information theoretic manner, by accelerating situational updates to the same effect \[[@CR12]\]. Arousal causes "trembling hands" \[[@CR6]\] as game theorists say, denoting a chance that some individuals accidentally cooperate, which in turn might entail a cascade of cooperation. An example of turmoil is the mutual provocation of soccer fans of opposing camps to a boiling point when fighting breaks out; their public good is the humiliation of their opponents. To show that turmoil can drive cooperation, we use an Ising model \[[@CR1], [@CR4]\], for which we make the behavioral options (spins) asymmetric, reflecting the asymmetry of defection versus cooperation. This provides a parsimonious explanation of cooperation without the usual mechanisms developed over longer time, and without rationality assumptions.

Model {#Sec2}
=====

At the beginning there is a group of *n* individuals who may not know one another yet, in an uncertain situation. Each of them has at least visual contact with some others, and identifies with, and is therefore inclined to conform to, others who share an interest in a given public good. The network of visual or verbal ties $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$n=20$$\end{document}$ and density = 0.8. In the latter, vertical line segments are composed of dots, each representing a micro state. The dash-dotted line is drawn with the mean field approach (MF).
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                \begin{document}$$n = 20$$\end{document}$ including all micro states (configurations of *C*'s and *D*'s) therein, and in a mean field approach (MF) for comparison. The Metropolis minimization of *H* starts at the defective state (at the left) and evolves by random steps over all micro states until the lowest value of *H* is reached at the cooperative state (at the right).
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=======

The relation between cooperation, *M*, and turmoil, *T*, turns out to be qualitatively the same for all networks. At low turmoil, there is no cooperation but it emerges at a critical level $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$S = \{1,-1/2\} $$\end{document}$. The horizontal axis indicates the number of swaps. A swap is generated by randomly choosing three nodes with 1 and 2 connected but not 1 and 3. Then 1's tie to 2 is relayed to 3. The simulation was repeated five times (plus signs) and resulted in an average value indicated by the dots connected by the dash-dotted line.

Social networks, if large, are clustered and sparse with a skewed degree distribution \[[@CR16]\]. We therefore examine the effects of clustering, density, degree distribution and size on the tipping point $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To investigate the effect of local variations of *S*, we generalize the values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conclusions {#Sec4}
===========

The model points out that under high uncertainty, the dilemma of cooperation can in principle be solved by situational turmoil among conformists. This solution holds for a broad range of networks, although the critical level of turmoil is markedly lower in small ones, which implies that turmoil-driven cooperation is more likely in small than in large groups. This result is consistent with empirical findings on violent group confrontations, where most of the physical violence is committed by small subgroups \[[@CR5]\]. Small fighting groups increase overall turmoil, though, which may agitate larger groups to join. The model also shows that there is no need for especially zealous initiative takers (with high $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$S_0$$\end{document}$) to get cooperation started, even though they help to get it started at lower turmoil.

Our contributions are threefold. First, we made an asymmetric Ising model, which has a different phase transition than the widely used symmetric model. Second, we provided computational evidence that the dilemma of cooperation can be solved without complicated and costly mechanisms such as reputations, selective incentives and rationality. Third, we showed which networks are most conductive to cooperation under high uncertainty. Future studies could confront the model with empirical data, perhaps even of different species, for example buffalo herd bulls who chase a lion together \[[@CR7]\]. One could also investigate more systematically the numbers of necessary Monte Carlo steps for different networks and distributions of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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